Abstract
Background
The far-reaching name dispute surrounding the so-called former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is undoubtedly a remnant of the early 20 th century Balkans turmoil (Herța, 2015, pp. 164-185) , a rather peculiar conflict chiefly involving this country and its southern neighbour, Greece, but with much a more intricate background, taking one all the way back of Yugoslavia, the severity of the controversy was somewhat appeased by the inherent division on the continent, albeit protests on the Greek side never ceased even at that time (Rossos, 2013) . What becomes of interest to us, as part of this study, is not to perform a history of the dispute, let alone explore its ancient history-inspired validity or linguistic/cultural bases. Instead, we aim to pursue the up-to-date perceptions on the matter under the auspices of FYROM's EU integration bid and to assess the prospects of the issue remaining a paramount hinderance -although far from the only one -in the aforementioned process.
Given its uniqueness in the history of EC/EU accession, which, of course, is no consolation to any of the parties involved, the case study deserves ample exploration and is fertile ground for scenario-building at a time when country denominations are seldom subjected to a process of alteration. Fairly recent precedents do exist, however, which, taken out of their respective geographic, geopolitical and historical contexts, could indicate several approaches to how a name dispute or at least a quest for a country name is likely to be tackled and prompt recognition from the international community may be achieved. A bird's eye view of the map of the world would take a wondering mind from the informally-called "Congo-Brazzaville" to South Sudan, or much closer to the case at hand, with names such as the Republic of Moldova, all of which could spark a note of controversy connected to the nottoo-distant past.
Having set the objective of examining the nature of the FYROM file, it becomes apparent that our study may in no way stake a claim to be comprehensive with respect to the Macedonian terminological dispute, but rather to examine some of its possible resolutions, from the standpoint of the broader file of the integration of the West Balkans into the European Union, which is of interest to us. That said, we acknowledge the fact that the controversy extends beyond, on the one hand, the EU integration endeavour, given the fact that the NATO membership of the country is also put on hold for similar reasons, and on the other hand, since Greece is not the only member state of the Union to have formulated objections to the integration bid (even though it has been by far the most vocal), with
Bulgaria expressing concern over the situation of its minority living on the territory of (Katsikas, 2012, pp. 74-78) . Nevertheless, we acknowledge that, while both NATO accession and EU negotiations are of importance to the country and broader area, we shall solely focus on the impact of the case on the latter file, whose intricacies are unquestionably greater than the much more straightforward former endeavour.
In order to underline our unbiased view on the thorny subject and to avoid complication over the nomenclature used, we shall opt for the acronym FYROM when neutrally addressing the country, with the full spelling of the word "former" in minuscule, in keeping with the United Nations' Security Council Resolution 817 of 7 April 1993, denoting a descriptive term, rather than an official name of a state (UN, 1993).
One more significant mention which we deem necessary for a proper introduction to the matter of perception surrounding the name dispute is the fact that, complementarily to it, FYROM has been involved, after gaining its independence in 1991, in a broader quest for a renewed national identity, one which would engender prestige and the kind of symbolism that Euro-Atlantic path, drawing stark criticism from Greece, but frowned upon by more and quickly turning into a focal point of the international community. To make matters worse, or at least more tortuous, under the impetus of the powerful FYROM diaspora, the occasional unrealistic leitmotiv of Greater Macedonia springs into public debate, which is not unique in Whilst formulating its objections on the historical accuracy of such claims as the aforementioned ones, usually grouped around the "antiquisation" concept, Greece has also turned to the classic argument of possible territorial claims made by a country bearing the same name as its northern province, a subject which has been put forward on occasions by FYROM nationalists. We concede that the logical validity of the assumption stands, as does its historical analogies that have occasionally been brought forth by Greek decision-makers, although we cast doubt on the likelihood of any actual change that may be triggered in foreseeable times by the action itself. Regardless, institutionally speaking, this objection has led to numerous setbacks, delays and failures in the integration and modernisation endeavours of FYROM, as soon as it became an independent nation. If a UN membership compromise was brokered in 1993 (Danforth, 1997, pp. 150-151) , in an unprecedented move surrounded by uncertainty over the future, a permanent solution appears to be the only clearcut guarantee that the country would be allowed to move forward in the two major national projects pending, i.e. NATO and EU membership. Negotiations under UN auspices have been pursued since 1994, with US senior diplomat Matthew Nimetz dedicating more than two decades of his career to this unique undertaking, in a truly spectacular case worthy of a thorough biographical insight, especially if a happy ending is eventually brokered (Peshkopia, 2014, pp. 195-205) .
Progress at the core of the issue was first achieved in 1995, with the Interim Accord brokered between Greece and FYROM, allowing the latter to broaden its international prospects (by joining the Council of Europe, for instance), on condition that some symbols and constitutional provisions be changed by FYROM -such as the discontinuation of the use of the Vergina Sun symbol on its national flag (Papavizas, 2006, pp. 224-225) . That said, despite economic ties running smoothly with both Greece and other countries on the continent, most of which have shown no sign of reluctance to adopt and use the name Republic of Macedonia, it is evident that neither NATO nor EU membership can advance with Greece's veto power hanging over the already complicated files. On the other hand, FYROM nationals have also been exhibiting particular sensitivity to the matter, reacting negatively to attempts to be referred to as "Skopians" or "Macedonian Slavs" (Roisman and 
Impact on FYROM's EU integration
The relations between FYROM and the European Union were initiated not long after the country's successful independence bid, while in 1995, the two parties engaged in formal Macedonian National Unity, and opposition leader Zoran Zaev, from the Social Democratic
Union. The involvement of the EU in the resolution of the crisis, which included accusations of illegal wiretapping and even the alleged obstruction of a murder investigation by the Government, was prompt and led to the signing of the Pržino Agreement, in July 2015 (Euractiv, 2015) . It becomes apparent that the EU has indeed assumed a stabilising role within the country, whose legitimacy partly stems from the decidedly pro-integration path adopted by Skopje. In fact, according to the European Commission's progress report on FYROM for 2018, the country has returned to a state of political stability (FYROM Report, 2018) , notably after the election of Zoran Zaev as Prime-Minister, with a pro-EU and pro-NATO message, albeit both endeavours remain blocked by the name dispute. with gentler but no less discrediting words: "I would love it a lot, but I think it is not possible" (Euractiv, 2018).
Prospects amid the latest developments
In the meantime, the Commission does not fail to take advantage of any means at its disposal to reassert its commitment to starting accession talks with both FYROM and Albania, as underlined by HR Federica Mogherini on 18 April 2018, on a visit to Tirana * The pro-EU agenda of the Party also emerges from the strategic documents published on its official platform:
http://www.sdsm.org.mk. † Same observation as above. See website: http://bdi.mk/en/index.php.
